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LAW AND THE DIGNITY OF NATURE:
FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Kenneth A. Manaster*
American legal institutions have failed to recognize fully the
interaction between the dignity of nature and the dignity of
human life. In this Article, Professor Manaster argues for an
increased awareness of three essential elements of life on Earth:
the interdependence of environmental forces and all forms of
life, the finitude of natural resources, and the limits of human
knowledge. Professor Manaster concludes that recognition of
these facts by lawyers and legal institutions can lead to the
development of more sophisticated tools for environmental deci-
sionmaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this Article is that law cannot promote the dignity
of human life unless it also fosters and expresses the dignity of
nature. If we are to have legal systems which will respect human
dignity, we must focus upon the broader question of how law can
work in harmony with, rather than in opposition to, the dignity
of nature. To achieve this, legal systems must appreciate three
facts of life on Earth: (1) the unity of nature; (2) the finitude of
this planet; and (3) the limits of human knowledge. These three
facts are different aspects of the mystery of life itself. This Article
will explore the implications of each of these aspects for ways in
which the American legal system can either respect or insult the
dignity of nature, and, thus, the ultimate dignity of human life.
The development of the American legal system has been
founded upon a denial of the unity of nature and humanity, a
denial of the finitude of the planet and its resources, and a denial
of the limits of human knowledge about the processes of life on
Earth. As a result, we now find ourselves struggling with serious
problems of environmental degradation, shortages of energy re-
sources, scarcities of raw materials, and extinction of many spec-
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ies of our fellow creatures. Those who work in law have been
operating on outmoded, even fictitious, notions which sooner or
later will help to create disaster for this planet and all its resi-
dents.
Ironically, just as we begin to conquer some of the ancient, life-
threatening perils of nature, such as disease and hunger, we find
that we face new threats to our survival, at least to our survival
as we have known it. Of course, the anomaly existing on a world
scale is that while technologically advanced nations are beginning
to struggle with these new and apparently self-created threats,
many other "undeveloped" portions of the world continue to fight
age-old battles. Realizing the magnitude of these problems, one
is tempted to give up in despair. Perhaps the developed world will
be destroyed in its own pollution and waste, while the underde-
veloped countries will. totter on the brink of extinction from star-
vation, disease, and internal disorder. Yet, there are indications
of a new awareness and resolve in this country and elsewhere that
rekindle hope.
To some extent, law is an expression of a society's values and
policy preferences. Beyond this, however, the power and influence
of law make it an important arena for the clarification and devel-
opment of new trends in human values. Thus, realization of the
facts of life will lead to beneficial changes not only in our actions
but also in our values. It is my hope that these thoughts will help
illustrate the ways in which the legal system can become a more
positive force in fostering and expressing the dignity of nature.
A few broad definitions are needed at the outset. By "nature,"
I refer to the entire physical context in which human beings find
themselves, or what is generally called "the environment."
"Human dignity" refers to an individual's sense of wholeness,
satisfaction, and well-being. This can only occur when one
achieves a balance between a sense of belonging to a broader
community and a sense of one's own identity-a realization of the
power to make effective choices about life.' These feelings can
only exist in people who live in conditions of basic social stability,
material prosperity, and physical health. "Legal systems" refers
to the entire complex of official statements in a society which
seeks to regulate the activities of people, and institutions such as
1. See G. MANASTER, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIFE TASKS 1277 (1977), which
states: "The point ... is one of fit and belonging. Fitting for yourself to be yourself, and
fitting in with others, belonging.with others."
[Vol. 26:743
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courts, administrative agencies, and legislative assemblies. The
discussion will focus upon the American legal system since the
United States embodies more of the problems addressed here
than does any other nation.2 Further discussion of the dignity of
nature will be deferred at this point because one of the major
objectives of this Article is to present some fundamental concepts
of this topic.
II. THE UNITY OF NATURE
One of the most frequently expressed themes of the environ-
mental movement over the last decade has been the interdepend-
ence of all life. In popular magazines, scholarly journals, high
school students' essays and noted ecologists' books, the point has
been made that it is time for humanity to realize it is a part of
nature and that all life forms are intertwined.' Seldom, however,
are these statements found in legal literature.4 Some students of
Western thought ascribe the current environmental crisis to the
Judaeo-Christian tenet of subjugating nature to human needs.5 In
contrast, it has been suggested that Eastern thought has a more
reverential attitude toward the unity of life.' I suspect that nei-
ther religious orientation is unambiguous about man's relation-
ship to nature,' but Eastern thought is more sophisticated than
2. "Also, American society epitomizes the modern way of life in most respects, and if
it can be shown that modernity will no longer work here, then it can be presumed to be
in trouble elsewhere." W. OPHULs, ECOLOGY AND THE PoLrIcs OF SCARCITY 3 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as OPHULS].
3. See, e.g., B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 11, 29-35 (1971); MURDOCH, Ecosystem
Science as a Point of Synthesis, in ENVIRONMENT: RESOURCES, POLLUTION AND BUECHNER,
reprinted in AMERICA'S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 20, 23-24 (R. Revell & H. Landsberg eds.
1970).
4. But see C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 42-54 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
STONE]; Metzger, Private Property and Environmental Sanity, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 793, 797-
99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Metzger]; H. & M. Sprout, The Ecological View-
point-and Others, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: THE STRUCTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 569 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Black & Falk]; Young, Environmental Law: Perspectives from Human Ecology, 6
ENVT'L LAW 289 (1976).
5. See generally W. LEISS, THE DOMINATION OF NATURE (1972); Lowenthal, Introduction
in G. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE XXiii-XXVii (1965 ed.) (1st ed. 1864).
6. A. WATTS, THE BOOK ON THE TABOO AGAINST KNOWING WHO YOU ARE 7-9 (1966);
Metzger, supra note 4, at 794-97; White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,
155 SCIENCE 1203 (1967).
7. See A. SILVER, WHERE JUDAISM DIFFERED 221-23 (1956); STONE, supra note 4, at
46-48.
1977]
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traditional Western religion about merging human existence and
consciousness into the Universe.'
For many years the discipline of ecology has explored the inter-
relationships of different forms of life. In recent years, the teach-
ings have taken on the quality of warnings, for the interdepen-
dencies have reached points of harmful breakdown. Thus, we now
know that pesticides and other chemicals travel persistently
through our waterways and the food chain into our bodies.' We
have learned that many species of birds and animals have become
extinct because of the indirect effects of waste disposal, pollution,
and the introduction of new land development projects and toxic
chemicals into their habitats. The examples are legion and have
been well-documented by leading ecologists.'"
Since 1972, there has been growing concern in America, Japan
and Europe that whales may become extinct. The 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm
adopted the whale as a symbol of the environmental crisis."
Those who slaughter whales for manufacturing purposes seem
content to eliminate the species. Instead of adopting enforceable
international management programs which would permit the
rational use of whales,' 2 the whaling industry continues its un-
restrained killing of these creatures. In contrast to this self-
defeating shortsightedness of the whaling industry is a move-
ment to preserve the creatures, not because of their value to man,
but because whales are awe-inspiring, intelligent, and friendly
animals. 3 Some people have found their own fate-their own
worth and self-respect-linked with the values humanity ex-
presses about the fate, worth, and respect due whales.
While the public is increasingly aware of the unity of nature,
lawyers and legal institutions have not come to that realization.
This may be the result of legal training which is geared toward
analyzing separate parts of a problem, rather than the whole.
Lawyers think in terms of individual conflicts, cases and statutes,
8. See generally D. HARDING, RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD (1966).
9. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
10. Comment, Vanishing Wildlife and Federal Protective Efforts, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 520,
528-32 (1971).
11. Jacobsen, A Call to Environmental Order, 28 BuLL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 21, 23 (1972).
12. Griffis, The Conservation of Whales, 5 CORNELL INT. L.J. 99, 100, 109 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Griffis].
13. See generally MIND IN THE WATERS (J. Mclntrye ed. 1974); F. MOWAT, A WHALE FOR
THE KILLING (1972); V. SCHEFFER, THE YEAR OF THE WHALE (1969).
[Vol. 26:743
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rather than the overall setting in which these matters arise. This
kind of narrow focus is even found in some of the recent attempts
to reform legal procedures for coping with environmental prob-
lems. Rather than establish a coordinated system, we create sepa-
rate agencies to deal with air pollution, water quality, and solid
waste management. Decisionmakers sometimes realize that the
solutions to problems in one area may create new problems in the
others, but seldom require that the interconnections be coordi-
nated. 4 Thus, air pollution authorities may demand the use of air
pollution control equipment which creates a liquid effluent, 5 fail-
ing to take into consideration the controls' effect upon water pol-
lution standards.
The same disjointed approach to the web of environmental ills
exists in judicial proceedings. Undoubtedly, there are occasions
when separate attacks on different facets of a complex environ-
mental problem eventually resolve all the issues involved. But
this occurs as much by chance as by design. A classic example of
this piecemeal approach arose in a melange of proceedings involv-
ing a waste disposal site for liquid industrial wastes. 6 The site
consisted of about eight large ponds, with a total surface area of
approximately 60 acres. Seepage into ground water constituted a
water pollution problem for state water authorities. Obnoxious
odors affected a nearby residential subdivision, constituting the
basis for an official abatement proceeding before the adjudicatory
arm of the regional air pollution control district. The placement
of another, new subdivision even closer to this site was handled
by the city and county. Finally, the basic arrangement for dis-
posal of the chemical wastes was a private matter between the
site operator and its customers. Ultimately, most of the problems
14. But see Environmental Protection Act of Illinois, ILL. Rlv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§1001-
1051 (1970).
15. Cf. M.A. Oberman, New Responsibilities for Sanitary Landfill, 8 WASTE AGE 16
(1977), which states: "[lit is becoming increasingly apparent that the masses of liquid
and hazardous wastes, as well as sludges which result from air and water pollution control
systems, are going to have to be disposed of on the land in an environmentally acceptable
manner."
16. Air Pollution Control Officer of the Bay Area Air Pollution Control Dist. v. In-
dustrial Tank, Inc., No. 510 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District,
order for dismissal entered August 17, 1976); Industrial Tank, Inc. v. Crocker Homes, Inc.,
No. 159004 (Super. Ct. of Contra Costa County, Cal., filed November 24, 1975); Lawrence
v. Industrial Tank, Inc., No. 147618 (Super. Ct. of Contra Costa County, Cal., filed
November 12, 1974).
1977]
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were alleviated, but this was no tribute to coordinated legal ac-
tion. The implicit legal assumption is that either there are no
interdependencies at all, or they are of minor importance.
There are signs of changes in the legal system's approach to
environmental problem-solving. However, most changes have
been limited to official oratory and more extensive gathering of
information. In the oratory department, the outstanding exam-
ple of change is Congress' prefatory statements in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA):17
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activ-
ity on the interrelations of all components of the natural envi-
ronment .... and recognizing further the critical importance of
restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continu-
ing policy ... to use all practicable means and measures ... in
a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare,
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony .... i
Even this statement seems to place man outside the
"interrelations of all components of the natural environment."
The "harmony" which is sought is a "productive" one, undoubt-
edly suggesting that man's interest in the productivity of the
environment is at least as important as the "harmony" aspect,
whatever that may be.
Regarding data collection, the creation of the "environmental
impact statement" device by NEPA is definitely a strong step in
the right direction. 9 Before government agencies take any action
that may have a significant environmental impact, they must
investigate, make public, and "consider" extensive information
about the network of environmental consequences of the proposed
project. The difficulty, of course, is that Congress and the courts
have been reluctant to do much more than exhort individual
decisionmakers to take this type of information into account. 0 As
17. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1970).
18. Id. §4331(a).
19. Id. §4332(2)(c).
20. "Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to require the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and other agencies to consider environmental issues just as they consider other
matters within their mandates."
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109, 11:31 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(emphasis in original). Accord, Society for California Archaelogy v. County of Butte, 65
Cal. App. 3d 832, 135 Cal. Rptr. 679, 683 (1977).
[Vol. 26:743
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yet, substantive requirements for decisions under NEPA have
been minimal."'
Since the development of increased environmental awareness
and more sophisticated regulation is an evolutionary process, it
may make sense to go slowly for the present. First, decisionmak-
ers must begin to think more comprehensively about the conse-
quences of their conduct. Later, it will be necessary to devise
means for requiring the decisions themselves to be consistent with
the interconnections discovered. The difficulty of that task must
not be underestimated."2
The type of analysis required by NEPA, and exemplified in
some of the judicial decisions, is an acknowledgement of the im-
pact that people have on the environment, which, in turn, affects
people. This is a recognition in law of the unity of nature, includ-
ing humanity. This type of thinking must be incorporated further
into our legal institutions. For example, the substantive require-
ments of attention to environmental impact statements must be
strengthened.2 3 Regulatory agencies must be established with a
broader, more integrated scope of jurisdiction." Lawyers, judges,
21. Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions, 19 S.D. L. REv. 279
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Yarrington].
22. See the court's comments in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C., 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
But some delay is inherent whenever the NEPA consideration is conducted
.... It is far more consistent with the purposes of the Act to delay operation
at a stage where real environmental protection may come about than at a stage
where corrective action may be so costly as to be impossible.
Id. at 1128.
It is interesting to note that there has been some public backlash against NEPA's
environmental impact statements and similar state statutory requirements. See, e.g.,
California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE. §21080.5 (West) (eff. Jan. 1,
1976); 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 1187, §1 [1975 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., No. 7 at 644-47]). "This
amendment to CEQA creates an alternative to the [Environmental Impact Report]
requirement for qualified state agencies have important environmental protection re-
sponsibilities." Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal.3d 190, 196, 553 P.2d 537, 539, 132
Cal. Rptr. 377, 379 (1976). Background explanation for this amendment, based upon
forestry industry protests, may be found at COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY, SEVENrH
ANNUAL REPORT 136 (1976). This backlash can be interpreted as an expression of frustra-
tion at being forced to take the time to take a broader view-this is just not the American
way! Fortunately most judicial decisions under NEPA have withstood this frustration in
order to require very comprehensive investigations to be made under the terms of these
statutes.
23. Some recent revisions of the California Environmental Quality Act appear to be
attempts to accomplish this. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§21002, 21002.1.
24. See Environmental Protection Act of Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§1001-1051
(1970).
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and officials charged with administration of environmental legis-
lation must be induced to take a broader view, to see the inter-
connections as clearly as possible. "The basic environmental rule
is to look ahead. '25
It is sometimes said that lawyers are trained in the art of con-
flict prevention and resolution. The present difficulty with train-
ing lawyers to work on environmental problems is that conflict
management is not the whole task. An analogy can be made to
the field of military warfare: given the incredible destructiveness
of nuclear weapons, military leaders must now realize that more
important than winning any given confrontation is the need to
preserve the battlefield itself. The paradox, which hopefully the
superpowers now recognize, is that nuclear victory is probably a
defeat for all.
Similarly, lawyers who are intent upon merely winning one
environmental struggle after another fail to realize that the limits
of their vision may ultimately turn their victories into defeats. If
lawyers successfully keep commercial whaling going at its present
pace, soon there will be no whaling interests for them to repre-
sent, because the whales will be extinct. The same concept is
applicable to lawyers for air pollution control agencies in urban
areas who succeed in imposing controls without regard to water
pollution effects, land use patterns, or solid waste management
practices. They too may find out that the industrial activities
they have sought to bring under control have become intolerable
for other reasons. If the world is "a harmonious system of con-
tained conflict," it is important for lawyers to begin to look at the
system itself, and not just at the individual conflicts." Otherwise,
they will help to bring about the self-destruction of civilized
human life.2"
25. J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA 240 (1976).
26. A. WArrs, THE BOOK ON THE TABOO AGAINST KNOWING WHO You ARE 78 (1966).
27. In a discussion of international legal order, one commentator uses the phrase "limit
situations" to describe those times at which "the pliability of human arrangements breaks
down-at which 'realities' exercise a veto over normative conventions." One type of
"limit situation," the "natural necessity" set, "arises from challenges that must be met
to permit the continuation of organized social life on this planet. These are the twin chal-
lenges of armed conflicts with modern weapons technology and of planetary ecological
collapse. The imperative of deflecting existing ecological trends away from looming cata-
strophe, forecast by a nearly unanimous scientific community, must therefore be accepted
[Vol. 26:743
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These habitual limitations of human perspectives, particularly
lawyers' perspectives, suggest that we are more comfortable with
aggression than we are with harmony. We easily can become
immersed in a particular struggle, perhaps because it is
"particular" or separable, and thus conceptually easier to grasp.
On the other hand, when we think about harmony and the inter-
connectedness of all things, it is easy to feel overwhelmed by the
unlimited and unstructured dimensions of the concepts.
The answer is that we must start looking at the total picture.
As adversaries and advocates, we must try to understand the field
on which we are fighting. As legislators and judges, we must also
expand our decisions to encompass many more of the connections
among different human activities and their effects on nature. As
teachers and students of environmental law, we must explore in
depth the ways in which we can redesign our thinking and our
tools to implement a far broader, more respectful approach to
humanity's relationship to the natural environment.
III. FINITUDE
Another of our mistaken premises is the notion that there are
no limits to the resources available for our material wealth and
comfort. It is likely that this way of thinking developed along with
the view that we can treat the environment as though it is made
up of separate parts. Once the concept of unity is accepted, and
perhaps even if it is not, we are forced to focus upon the reality
of finitude. There are limits to the resources of this planet.
The list of dwindling resources includes critical minerals, en-
ergy fuels, timber, foodstuffs, and clean air and water.2" Ameri-
cans traditionally have regarded these resources as infinite. Legal
concepts which developed in response to the desire to industrial-
ize and settle this country strengthened the notion that America's
resources are unlimited." However, many people have now be-
come aware of nature's limits. As disciplines other than law begin
as establishing a limit situation of a new kind." Gottlieb, The Nature of International
Law: Toward a Second Concept of Law, in Black & Falk, supra note 4, at 331, 337-39.
28. J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY 237 (1976).
29. See generally Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in Ameri-
can Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1973).
19771
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to perceive these limits, we must ask what response the law will
make to this new grasp of reality.
The most significant modern expression of Earth's finitude is
the study entitled The Limits to Growth, which appeared in 1972
under the auspices of the Club of Rome, a private organization
including international industrialists, scientists, and econo-
mists. 0 This book "did the most to shape the current debate on
ecological limits," and the debate it has engendered is
"enormous." 3' With the use of sophisticated computer modeling
techniques, the study team, centered at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, developed a "world model" of the incredibly
complex interactions of five main aspects of the present world
situation: pollution, food production, industrialization, popula-
tion, and consumption of nonrenewable natural resources.2 In
essence, the study offered a persuasive and sobering admonition
that the people of the world cannot act in these five realms as
though there are no "limits to growth. '3
There are a few possibilities regarding the outcome of the limits
debate. One is that the debate will not be resolved in time to head
off catastrophic breakdown in the functioning of the present
world pattern of resources use. Another is that the debate will go
on but no such problems will arise; that is, the Limits to Growth
30. D. H. MEADOWS, D. L. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS, & W. BEHRENS III, THE LIMITS TO
GROWTH: A REPORT OF THE CLUB OF ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (2d
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as LiMrrs TO GROWTH].
31. OPHULS, supra note 2, at 17.
32. LIMITS TO GROWTH, supra note 30, at 25.
33. Id. at 169-70. The LIMITS TO GROWTH study is controversial. Whether its analytical
methods, data, and computer techniques are valid is beyond my capacity to judge, and
the study apparently remains so complex an area of judgment that it continues to baffle
experts in various disciplines. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
52-53 (1972); MODELS OF DOOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (H. Cole et al., eds.
1973); ON GROWTH: THE CmsIs OF EXPLODING POPULATION AND RESOURCE DEPLETION (W.
Oltmans ed. 1974); ON GROWTH Two (W. Oltmans ed. 1975); Rabinowitch, Needed: A
Political Program for the Technological Age, 28 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 11, 14-15 (1972);
Visit to a Small Planet, NEWSWEEK, November 3, 1975, at 76; Courting a Golden Age -
Or Disaster, San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 4, 1975, at 8.
It is worth noting, however, that the LIMITS TO GROWTH study explicitly chose conserva-
tive assumptions in its analysis, thus diminishing the possible objections to it. Further-
more, a later study employing somewhat different approaches has reached similar conclu-
sions. M. MEsAiovic & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT: THE SECOND REPORT
TO THE CLUB OF ROME (1974). See also RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A REPORT TO
THE CLUB OF ROME (J. Tinbergen, coordinator 1976).
[Vol. 26:743
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advocates will have been proven wrong. This possibility seems
highly unlikely, in view of shortages the world is already experi-
encing in such things as food supplies, energy resources, critical
metals and clean water. One commentator has observed that
the growth debate is no longer even a question of whether there
are limits, but rather of when they will be reached.3 A third pos-
sibility is that the debate will soon be resolved, and a consensus
among the world's "experts" will emerge. If that consensus is
one that expresses a recognition of finitude of our planetary
resources, then new legal measures will have to be devised to
express the new thinking.
This new way of thinking has already begun, even though the
debate is not over and perhaps never can be. The immediate
question is whether changes in the legal system can and should
begin now in order to come into harmony with the increasing
evidence of natural limits. Our present situation is analogous to
a request for a preliminary injunction in litigation in which the
plaintiff is alleging that the defendant's continued course of con-
duct will destroy some irreplaceable natural resource. The ques-
tions asked in such a hearing relate to irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if relief is not granted, and to whether the plaintiff's
position is likely to succeed on the merits after the case is fully
heard.35
The "case" now has to do with the overall integrity, or dignity,
of the natural environment. It is necessary to reexamine many of
our legal concepts and institutions because there may be irrepara-
ble harm to all of us on Earth if this "plaintiff's" position is valid.
It may be noted, of course, that almost all of us are both plaintiffs
and defendants in this case, for it is our own modern lifestyles and
definitions of our "needs" which create the misuse of our planet
which imperils our own well-being. 6
34. OPHULS, supra note 2, at 2.
35. See, e.g., Congress of Railway Unions v. Hodgson, 326 F. Supp. 68, 76-77 (D.D.C.
1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878, 880-81
(D.D.C. 1971). See also Comment, Imminent Irreparable Injury: A Need for Reform, 45
So. CAL. L. REV. 1025 (1972).
36. The impossibility of taking a strict adversary view of the interested parties when
looking broadly at environmental ills is illustrated by the rejection of the attempted class
action in Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App.3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
1977]
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Again it appears that lawyers, whose business it is to deal with
specific areas of discord rather than with the search for overall
harmony, have ignored the Limits to Growth debate.37 Obviously
few lawyers would have the necessary qualifications to challenge
the technical aspects of the debate. Nevertheless, lawyers and
legal scholars, especially those concerned about the quality and
survival of the environment, should begin to address ways in
which the legal system will have to change if and when the Limits
to Growth advocates win their point, assuming that they do so
prior to the time that their most dire predictions come true. The
legal system must cease to be employed to promote the philoso-
phy that more is always better." Rather it must begin to recog-
nize that this planet is finite and that we must act in accordance
with that reality. Since we do not know what the limits are, we
had best structure our institutions and activities in a more con-
servative fashion-using the word "conservative" in its primary
meaning-which will preserve our options while more evidence is
gathered. To the extent that legal institutions do provide some
measures for dealing with the problems created by new activities,
they usually place the burden of proof upon the naysayer, the one
who can point to and "prove" the resulting harm.4"
37. But see Ruff, Book Review, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 879 (1972) (review of THE LIMITS TO
GROWTH).
38. "We have learned that more is not necessarily better, that even our great Nation
has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions nor solve all
problems." Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
87, 88 (Jan. 24, 1977).
The pervasiveness of the traditional thinking is dramatically illustrated in Garrett
Hardin's classic essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The legal
system's facilitation of this mentality is noted at W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OF PENGUINS: THE
CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 34 (1974). In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
421 U.S. 60, 93-94 n.28 (1975), the Court acknowledged that "a problem would arise when
the grant of a variance [from Clean Air Act requirements in a state implementation plan]
to one source would not affect national [ambient air quality] standards, but the simulta-
neous or subsequent grant of similar variances to similar sources could result in the plan's
failure to insure the attainment and maintenance of the standards." Faced with the fact
that there would not be room for more air pollutants in this situation, the Court merely
deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's claim that it "does not view the prob-
lem as insurmountable."
39. See E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL, ECONOMICS As IF PEOPLE MATTERED 23-24
(1973).
40. See text accompanying notes 74-84, infra.
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To cite one example, the Chairman of the Federal Consumer
Product Safety Commission recently was interviewed with regard
to charges, based upon laboratory testing of animals, that certain
flame-retardant chemicals used in children's pajamas are carcin-
ogenic and therefore should be banned.4 The Chairman replied
that he had no authority to "intervene in the normal workings of
the market place?' without much more proof of danger to chil-
dren. How much proof should be required from the objectors is a
difficult question, but what is more difficult to contend with is
the unstated premise that the manufacturer has a right to intro-
duce any product he wishes into the marketplace and that the
force of law cannot be brought to bear on the situation until after
the product is marketed.
Surely the modern, Nader-age device of the product recall is a
step in the direction of consumer and environmental protection.
One does wonder, however, whether some alteration in the initial
assumption about one's unquestioned right to engage in a new
manufacturing or building activity might be a much more pro-
found step toward protecting nature, including its human compo-
nents.
It is important to remember that to some extent legal institu-
tions express values formed elsewhere in society, and to some
extent they form them. It is thus a matter deserving further study
to identify various, specific areas in which the more-is-better phi-
losophy pervades the law. I suspect that profound examples of
such thinking would be found in many areas, including (1) local
land use policies and development procedures; (2) tax policies,
including personal exemptions, investment credit, and mineral
depletion allowance provisions; (3) utility rate structures, with
the customary provisions for lower rates for increased usage; and
(4) product safety approval schemes, such as those covering
foods, drugs, pesticides, and toxic chemicals. These four areas
come to mind because they seem to be the first areas in which
41. NBC "Today" Show, Jan. 18, 1977. For further information concerning the Tris
controversy, see Petition of the Environmental Defense Fund to Ban the Sale of Tris-
Treated Wearing Apparel, (U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, filed February
8, 1977); Petition of the Environmental Defense Fund for the Issuance of a Consumer
Product Safety Rule, No. HP 76-10 (U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, filed
March 24, 1976); 5 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 221 (Mar. 25, 1977).
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changes in the fundamental premises are beginning to take place.
One final point must be mentioned. The capacity of technology
ultimately to overcome earthly finitude must be considered.
Some persons see our salvation in the development of greater
efficiency in resource use and substitutes for materials upon
which we have previously depended. There are even those who
carry this approach to the point of confidence that technological
genius will devise means for carrying humanity to other planets
when Earth is used up.
Obviously there is a great, almost miraculous capacity of hu-
mans to develop their tools to achieve their objectives." But if the
Limits to Growth advocates are correct, then technology ulti-
mately is not the solution." There are many reasons for this,
probably the greatest of which is the inescapable problem of
human ignorance, to which I will turn next.
IV. THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
We humans do not know what power has put us on Earth, nor
do we know what, if anything, life on Earth is "for." In this
existential sense, we cannot answer the question of what we
"should" do with this experience of life. Similarly, there is no way
of knowing what ultimately is the "best" approach we should
take to use of the planet.
[MIan, both through his trivial limitations and through
those profounder ones that stem from his intrinsic nature, can-
not know it all because of his scale in space and time and be-
cause he cannot step out of himself, cannot know of the water
in which he swims."
Not only is our knowledge limited in this ultimate way, but we
are also becoming aware that we are tremendously limited in our
knowledge of the physical consequences of what we do with the
planet. "Today we are using the biosphere, the living space, as
42. See D. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER, 161 (1954), which states that "[albundance, as a horse-breeder might say,
is by technology out of environment."
43. LIMITS TO GROWTH, supra note 30, at 129-55; OPHULS, supra note 2, at 116-27.
44. Sir D. H. Wilkinson, The Quarks and Captain Ahab or: The Universe as Artifact,
(unpublished lecture before Dep't of Physics, Stanford University, January, 1977).
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an experimental laboratory.""
The evidence of our ignorance is staggering. We manufacture
chemicals which affect our health and well-being in unexpected,
delayed, devastating ways, even though our original intentions in
producing them were laudable. Speak of kepone, thalidomide,
DDT, asbestos, and the point is made. Consider the increasing
evidence that many forms of cancer are the result of human expo-
sure to what are essentially new products and wastes of man,
created to serve apparent needs.4" The previously mentioned ex-
ample of pajamas treated with a possibly carcinogenic flame-
retardant chemical can be added to the list.
If all life on Earth is unified and interdependent, and if the
planet's resources ultimately are limited, then it also should be
apparent by now that the system of life is so complex that any-
thing we make or do affecting our physical surroundings not only
may have unknown effects, but probably will have unknown ef-
fects, many of which will be adverse. "Generally, when man has
tampered'with one element of nature's balance, unforeseen and
detrimental results have occurred."47 There is no such thing as a
free lunch when we tamper with the ecological unity of which we
are a part."
There is a further reason why our knowledge is limited. That
is because the effects of what we do are very frequently delayed
in time. Only recently, for example, has it been discovered that
use of X-rays for shrinking tonsils in the 1940's created a very
high likelihood of thyroid cancer. This evidence only began to
appear in the patients many years after the treatment, which was
apparently successful at the time for its original purpose. 9 The
Limits to Growth study has also acknowledged this time gap
problem with respect to cumulative pollution effects.50
45. Lord Ritchie-Calder, Mortgaging the Old Homestead, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 207, 208
(1970).
46. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 17-26 (1975).
47. Griffis, supra note 12, at 101. Also consider remarks found in STONE, supra note 4,
at 32, which read: "All burdens of proof should reflect common experience; our experience
in environmental matters has been a continual discovery that our acts have caused more
long-range damage than we were able to appreciate at the outset."
48. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 41 (1971).
49. See Norwood, X-Rays: A Troubled Picture, NEW TIMES, March 4, 1977, at 54.
50. LIMITS TO GROWTH, supra note 30, at 81-84.
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There is undoubtedly a tremendous amount we have already
learned about this world, the solar system and beyond, and many
more frontiers of knowledge surely will be broken hereafter. How-
ever, it does not appear that we will ever have the whole system
understood in all its operational details,5 not to mention its ulti-
mate significance. The paradox is that we cannot even know what
the limits of knowing are, for in order to do that we would have
to understand the totality, which we cannot.
The question for lawyers is whether the inescapable limits of
human ignorance should have explicit bearing on human deci-
sionmaking about the natural environment. Can we create insti-
tutions for preserving and respecting a system which we do not
and cannot fully understand?
Three approaches are available to aid in the resolution of this
question. First, we may continue to ignore the unity, finitude,
and enigma of life. Second, we can develop much more sophisti-
cated tools for evaluating the effects of our use of the planet in
terms of the concept of environmental risk. As a third approach,
we could place a much higher value upon the ecological system,
either as it was before humanity started altering it or at least as
it is now in most respects.
Fears about the results of the first approach already have been
made clear. 2 The other two approaches, or a combination of
them, may still offer the opportunity for lawyers to make a benefi-
cial contribution in the quest for natural dignity.
The effort to develop more sophisticated tools for evaluating
the effects of use of the planet is already underway. The creation
of the environmental impact statement by NEPA was an attempt
to provide a much more complete informational base.53 The com-
51. See E. LASZLO, A STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE: THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO WORLD
ORDER 80 (1974), which states:
Our capacity to predict just what action taken today depresses or enhances
the economic and social options of people living one hundred years hence is,
despite the computer projections of Forrester, Meadows, et al., practically negli-
gible. We cannot foretell the technological developments over the next one
hundred years, nor how the present data gaps will be filled in.
52. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
53. See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, the court stated: "[Olne of the functions of an
impact statement is to point up the uncertainties where they exist."
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puter studies in the Limits to Growth debate also permit more
understanding of attenuated and time-delayed environmental
consequences. There is, however, very little that is new in the
approaches that lawyers and judges take to evaluating environ-
mental implications of new activities and products.
Most environmental litigation sooner or later results in a classic
"balancing act" determination. The court finds itself doing the
traditional job of nuisance law: balancing the detriment to one
party from the activity in question against the benefit to the other
party.5" The modern pollution case, especially one in which in-
junctive relief is at issue, most vividly demonstrates this.55 At best
some clear evidence of the broader community interests at stake
also is weighed in the balance.
This same type of balancing process is what the courts have
interpreted NEPA to require in the decisionmaking of govern-
ment agencies.5" Some commentators have urged "substantive"
judicial review under NEPA so that the courts will make these
cost-benefit determinations or at least set the limits of tolerable
determinations by the agencies.57
Assuming that all possible information about environmental
consequences were available, it would still be very difficult to
make these balancing decisions. The difficulty lies primarily in
the fact that the comparisons to be made include factors which
are not susceptible to quantification and which are valued on
different levels of the human experience. These factors include
jobs, clean air, preservation of animal species, and new labor-
saving products.58 Beyond this, however, the magnitude of the
task is compounded by the limits of knowledge, the fact that we
can never be sure that we have all the pertinent information.
The concept of risk is one with which lawyers are familiar,
primarily from the field of torts. The concept assumes imperfect
knowledge about future consequences and therefore addresses
54. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §87, at 580-81 (4th ed. 1971).
55. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870
(1970).
56. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 247-58 (1973).
57. See Yarrington, supra note 21.
58. Compare J. KRIER, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 73 (1971) with W. BAXTER,
supra note 38, at 12, 106.
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results in terms of probabilities.59 What is beginning to develop
in environmental law is the increased use of environmental risk
as a touchstone for making the types of difficult decisions dis-
cussed here. To date this approach is manifest mainly as part of
the balancing acts, where the court or administrative agency
looks at the probabilities and magnitude of the harms and bene-
fits at issue and reaches some sort of policy preference. "0 Only
recently has there been clear recognition of the fact that this is
being done amidst imperfect knowledge. In the Reserve Mining
litigation, and in the litigation over the Environmental Protection
Agency's regulations under the Clean Air Act for limiting the lead
content of gasoline, courts have focused upon the need to evaluate
risks and benefits despite the impossibility of having at hand all
the information desirable about the possible dangers.6 In each
instance the courts were focusing upon risks, the degree of likeli-
hood that certain adverse events would come to pass. "2
What is instructive about these recent decisions is that they are
explicit about the use of risk analysis, and that they acknowledge
to some extent that the court and the parties to the cases are
operating in the dark. 3 This recognition does not necessarily
make the decisions any easier, but it does make them more realis-
tic and honest. Once the court or any other decisionmaker admits
that there are imponderable elements involved, it would seem
less likely that a reckless decision will be made. Risks will still
be taken, but hopefully fewer catastrophic surprises will be en-
countered later. If the International Whaling Commission, for
59. See generally R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS, 49-52, 87-94 (1963). A
good introduction to the growing interest in "technology assessment" may be found in
Speth, The Federal Role in Technology Assessment and Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW 420 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
60. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§42352, 42354 (West Supp. 1977).
61. Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
Reserve Mining Co. v. E.P.A., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). Although Reserve involved
judicial use of risk analysis as a basis for direct injunctive relief and Ethyl involved
judicial review of administrative use of it, analytically the cases are quite similar.
62. "Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects." W. LAWRANCE,
OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 94 (1976).
63. See Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d at 6, 12-13, 17-20, 24-25, 28, 44; Reserve Mining
Co. v. E.P.A., 514 F.2d at 519-20, 528-29. See generally Comment, Projected Environ-
mental Harm: Judicial Acceptance of a Concept of Uncertain Risk, 53 J. URB. L. 497
(1976).
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example, were to admit that there are serious gaps in human
knowledge about the life habits and breeding patterns of whales,
then it could be acknowledged that even the quota systems and
new management program for "harvesting" whales may result in
their extinction. 4 Once the risk is acknowledged and the uncer-
tainty admitted, the decision to kill them or not kill them be-
comes more informed and realistic. If the policy judgment to run
this risk is made, at least it is done so more candidly and, hope-
fully, it will be subject to more informed public scrutiny.
A graphic example of the attempt to probe the limits of human
predictive capacity is the recent Dow Chemical Company pro-
posal to build the first of a thirteen factory petrochemical com-
plex in the Sacramento River Delta area near San Francisco,
California." A major issue which developed over this proposal was
the likely effect of emissions from the first plant on air quality in
the vicinity, as measured in terms of the pertinent federal am-
bient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. Although the
hearings on this issue were aborted by Dow's decision to suspend
the entire proposal, a tremendous quantity of evidence of a highly
technical character had already been presented on the air quality
issue. The incredible number of variables involved in the predic-
tive calculations, as well as the inadequacy of the historical data
base, made it quite evident that, despite all the technical exper-
tise being brought to bear, there was some irreducible element of
guesswork involved. Nonetheless, a decision would have had to be
reached had the proposal gone forward. Such a decision would
have had to explicitly acknowledge that to some extent it was
based upon limited knowledge and thus amounted to risk evalua-
tion.
Candid acknowledgment of reliance upon risk is, in one sense,
very familiar to lawyers. In another sense, however, it is anath-
ema to them, for it is the habit of lawyers to speak of something
as "proven" even though the tests of proof are based upon less
than absolute certainty, such as "proven beyond a reasonable
64. See Wint, Can Quotas Save the Whales?, 60 SIERRA CLUB BULL., No. 7, August-
September 1976, at 28.
65. See In re Application of the Dow Chemical Company for a Permit to Construct, No.
567 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, order granting withdrawal
of appeals entered February 3, 1977).
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doubt," "proven by clear and convincing evidence," "proven by
a preponderance of the evidence," "proven to be more probable
than not." The reality which lawyers often mask with a well-
entrenched fiction is that we do rely upon probabilities, relative
degrees of uncertainty, and evaluations of risk in much of the
work we do.66 To be explicit about this in environmental law
would be a valuable step toward higher awareness of the ways in
which human activity endangers the natural "spaceship" in
which we find ourselves."
Although there is some movement in this direction,68 more judi-
cial and scholarly examination is needed of the ways in which
legal evaluation of environmental risks is conducted. We proba-
bly will not be able to get away from the value-laden policy judg-
ments which are represented by the balancing acts, but we can
make them more honest and prudent by acknowledging the limits
of knowledge within which we are working.
The third approach to the inescapable limits of knowledge is
to place a much higher value upon the status quo, or even the
"status quo ante" to the extent that it can be re-created. Perhaps
it would have been better to leave many things as they were,
respecting the status quo of nature rather than disregarding it as
we advanced down the road of material progress. The common
dogma of past decades is characterized by the often-quoted state-
ment that "without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a
very pretty village. 9
The new thinking is that economic and technological progress
can proceed without the tremendous degree of waste, pollution,
and unrecycled use of resources which has historically character-
ized industrial growth. There is no need to determine whether
America could have reached its present state of prosperity with-
out pollution and waste, other than for the value such a retrospec-
66. This point is clearly acknowledged in Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d at 17-20.
67. See Hardin, The Earth is a Spaceship, EXPLORING NEW ETHICS FOR SURVIVAL 16
(1972).
68. See notes 63 supra and 75 infra. See also Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific
Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 So. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1974); Kantrow-
itz, The Science Court Experiment, 13 TRIAL, No. 3, March 1977, at 48.
69. Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 PITT. LEG. J. 379 (Ct. of C.
P. of Allegheny County, Pa., Musmanno, J.). But see Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441,
452-53, 464-65, 109 A.2d 310, 316, 322 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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tive assessment might have for underdeveloped countries desiring
to grow economically without duplicating our environmental mis-
takes. What is immediately important is to determine what poli-
cies we should pursue now. One possible approach which the legal
system can begin to express more readily is the idea that the
existing balances of nature are presumptively better than what
they might become through the effects of unrestricted human
progress.
There is already some recognition among legal thinkers that the
status quo of nature, even in its present state of partial despolia-
tion, is worthy of respect as a matter of operating legal principle.
Professor Christopher Stone, in his famous essay on the issue of
standing for natural objects, at one point suggests that the mea-
sure of damages for invasion of the rights of natural objects could
be "the cost of making the environment whole."7 Even though
this amounts to asking for a "freeze" on present environmental
quality, Stone finds this "not inconceivable.. . as a general goal,
especially considering that, even by the most immediately dis-
cernible homocentric interests, in so many areas we ought to be
cleaning up and not merely preserving the environmental status
quo."7 Relying upon Stone's article in his dissent in Sierra Club
v. Morton,72 Justice Douglas seems to be saying that the best
spokesman for the natural object is the person who relates to it
in its most pristine condition. However, he does not make this
explicit.
The concept of natural balance should become the principal
criterion in environmental decisionmaking. Whether it be based
upon faith, or upon the increasing evidence of natural unity,
earthly finitude, and human ignorance, it should become a guid-
ing principle of environmental law that what naturally is should
be respected and preserved in its present condition, or in its prior
condition if re-creation of the prior condition is possible and bene-
ficial. This concept rests upon the premise that nature is a unified
system which has a balance or harmony built into it, with which
70. STONE, supra note 4, at 29.
71. Id. at 30. See also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effec-
tive Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 565 (1970).
72. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
73. Id. at 743-45, 749-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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we ought not to tamper except for demonstrably good reason.
This is not an argument for no growth whatsoever or for doom-
ing millions of people to their present incomes, places of residence
and lifestyle. This concept is suggested only as a rebuttable pre-
sumption or as a change in the rules of burden of proof. Using
these familiar legal devices, we should restructure our basic ap-
proaches to tampering with nature.
It is difficult, without considerably more detailed investigation,
to know precisely how this restructuring would operate. A few
preliminary ideas are offered, however, some of which are based
on recent judicial and legislative developments and scholarly
writings. For example, Professor James E. Krier, in an early
article on the nature of the burden of proof in environmental
litigation, has suggested that the courts in both pollution cases
and conservation cases should place the burden of proof upon
the party which already has created or wishes to create some
damaging disruption of the environment. 4
The previously mentioned Reserve Mining and Ethyl Corp. v.
E.P.A. decisions are cases in which the question of the burden of
proof was at issue. The courts seemed to recognize that, when
dealing with areas of environmental and medical uncertainty, it
would be impossible for a plaintiff to prove definitely that specific
dangers would come to pass. Focusing upon the statutory phrase
"will endanger," the majority in Ethyl alleviated the burden of
proof by acknowledging that the magnitude or severity of the risk
must be correlated with the gravity of the harm in question. In
that respect the traditional degree of probability of harm that
burden of proof rules require may be somewhat lessened.75
This greater sophistication regarding burden of proof problems
is consistent with the kind of risk analysis discussed above and
is not unknown in the law of torts." It is not, however, fully the
74. Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970).
75. Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F. 2d at 18, quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. E.P.A., 514
F.2d at 519-20. See W. Thomas, Judicial Treatment of Scientific Uncertainty in the
Reserve Mining case (Mar. 3, 1976) (paper presented at Fourth National Symposium on
Statistics and the Environment, National Academy of Sciences).
76. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 147: "As the gravity of the possible harm in-
creases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less." See also
Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, Law and Policy: The Use of Mathematical Probabilities in the
Judicial Factfinding Process, in THE TORTS PROCESS 94 (1975).
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shifting of burden of proof called for by Krier. Under his view, it
would be incumbent upon the user of allegedly jeopardized envi-
ronmental resources to prove that its activities are not already
polluting or destroying in a dangerous or unjustified manner.7 In
the area of conservation, Krier's suggestion similarly would call
for the proponent of some new activity or product to meet the
burden of proving its environmental safety and wisdom before
going ahead with it.7" At least one court has recognized that the
movement for enforceable, substantive review of decisions under
NEPA may call for realignment of burden of proof rules.79
Another recent development which can be seen as shifting the
burden of proof rules, or raising a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the status quo, is the new federal Toxic Substances Control
Act.80 For the first time Congressional policy seeks to require
producers of new chemical products to prove before marketing
them that they do not pose "unreasonable risk(s) of injury to
health or the environment."'" This reverses the premise pre-
viously discussed concerning the unlimited right of persons to
make new uses of nature.82
A third area in which a concept of natural balance and the
value of the status quo could come to play is that of basic real
property rights. Professor Joseph Sax's views on possible expan-
sion of the public trust doctrine are along these lines."8 Similar
suggestions have appeared elsewhere, calling for attention to the
natural priorities of land use inherent in the characteristics of the
land itself.84
Undoubtedly there are many other areas in which recognition
of the limits of our knowledge can be transformed into more effec-
77. Krier, supra note 74, at 116-19.
78. Id. at 111-15.
79. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1334-35 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See also
Yarrington, supra note 21, at 293-94.
80. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). See also
Environmental Defense Fund v. E.P.A., 9 E.R.C. 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The burden of
proof in a suspension hearing under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act is on the registrant of a poison covered by the Act.
81. Id. at §§2(a)(2), 4(a)(1)(A)(i).
82. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
83. Sax, supra note 71, at 557-65.
84. See Metzger, supra note 4, at 816-18; id. at 817 n.113, citing Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
1977]
HeinOnline  -- 26 DePaul L. Rev. 765 1976-1977
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tive legal approaches to decisionmaking aimed at maintenance of
the inherent integrity of nature, unfathomable as it may be. In
our evaluation of ecological risks, in the balancing of these risks
against possible social, economic, or political benefits of proposed
action, we can make respect of natural balance a central value.
If we choose to tamper with nature, we can explain why we are
doing it and can try to explain how much or little we know about
the risks we choose to take.
CONCLUSION
There are two levels upon which the above discussion may be
of value. The first is the broad level of awareness, of understand-
ing of the existential context in which we humans are part of
nature and interact with other elements of it. If environmental
lawyers and other persons involved in daily decisions about this
interaction were to approach their work with greater awareness
of the three facts of life emphasized here, we could work much
more effectively toward harmony with nature, and thus toward
greater dignity for the experience of life itself. 5
At a more practical level, the concepts discussed offer a basis
for further analysis of the premises underlying the legal system
as it affects the environment. Out of such analysis can come
restructuring of the tools and working concepts of environmental
law. Some changes along these lines already are appearing, and
many more are needed. As these changes are made, the legal
system can help to define the path toward increasing preservation
of the dignity of nature and of the dignity of humanity within it.
85. Although most of the text here has been phrased in terms of what the legal system
itself "says" or "does," it must be remembered that the actual subject at hand is people's
attitudes and actions as expressed through legal tools. The importance of remembering
the fictional character of descriptions of law as something independent of "the persons
who speak to us through rules and of the persons to whom the rules are spoken," has been
strongly emphasized in J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 28 (1976).
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